Post by ck4829 on Oct 15, 2017 12:54:28 GMT
President Donald J. Trump has denounced the Iran nuclear agreement, saying “we will not continue down a path whose inevitable result is more violence, more chaos, and Iran’s nuclear breakout.” The announcement does not withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which the United States lifted sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits to its nuclear program, but instead asks Congress to reconsider it. For Ariane Tabatabai, a nonproliferation expert at Georgetown University, the move damages U.S. credibility while raising the risk of confrontation in the Middle East. Still, she says, if the European Union remains committed to the deal, then from the Iranian perspective “the JCPOA is worth keeping.”
What are the grounds for President Trump’s decertification of the nuclear agreement?
The decision is political, not technical. President Trump is signaling to his base that he is tough, and that he’s rolling back some of President Obama’s chief legacies.
Various folks even within the administration—Secretary of Defense [Jim] Mattis and Secretary of State Tillerson—as well as U.S. military personnel, including [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Joseph] Dunford, have said that it is in the United States’ national interest to stick to the nuclear deal. Even those who were not necessarily in favor of passing it have come out and said that the U.S. should continue to implement it.
There is a broad consensus that Iran has been complying with the nuclear deal. The [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] director-general, Yukiya Amano, gave remarks just days before President Trump’s decertification remarks saying that Iran was complying with the deal. That’s also the position of the European Union and the Joint Commission [established by the JCPOA to mediate its implementation]. And when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with the Iranians [at the UN General Assembly in September], he said there is no question that the Iranians were complying with the technical elements of the deal.
But the president also believes Iran is not in compliance with the “spirit” of the nuclear deal. The Europeans and others have said that containing Iran’s nuclear program contributes to international peace and security, even if [there has not been] a huge overhaul in Iranian behavior. But the deal wasn’t meant to address all the challenges Iran poses to stability and security in the region and beyond. It was designed as a very focused process, curtailing the country’s sensitive nuclear activities.
This speech comes just a few weeks after Trump extended waivers on nuclear-related sanctions. What outcome is he after now?
The president has gone for something like the DACA move: passing the buck to Congress. In essence, the president is decertifying the deal not on the grounds that Iran is failing to uphold its end of the bargain—though he has also indicated that he believes Iran is not complying with the deal—but due to his view that the deal isn’t in the U.S. national interest. This kicks the ball to Congress.
Congress can refuse to impose more sanctions, avoiding rocking the boat any further. Another scenario would be that Congress imposes sanctions. Quite a few moderate Republicans who were against the nuclear deal seem to believe that it is not in the United States’ interest to withdraw from it currently, and so they would be reluctant to impose more sanctions, but it is too close to call.
The third emerging option would be for Congress to hold off on imposing new sanctions but to unilaterally install new goal posts, or so-called trigger points. In other words, it’d say, for example, that if Iranian breakout time—the time it’d take to accumulate enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon—goes below the current estimated one-year mark, sanctions would be automatically imposed. This option means Congress would modify the agreement by itself, with little or no input from the other parties, imposing restrictions on Iran that it hasn’t agreed to and would have no reason to implement.
What if Congress declines to reimpose sanctions?
In that case we’re not necessarily going to see a big immediate effect on the nuclear deal, but there will be an impact down the road.
A couple of questions that will have to be answered are: How sustainable will the deal be without the United States? And how will uncertainty surrounding the future of the deal impact economic recovery for Iran? There’s already been uncertainty because of the 2016 [U.S.] presidential elections. This has added to challenges stemming from Iran’s own domestic challenges—corruption, mismanagement of the economy—as well as the remaining sanctions. All of these have made investors and businesses reluctant to jump into the Iranian market. But with the deal decertified by the president, the looming threat of more sanctions, and the moving of goal posts by Congress, will businesses and investors go into Iran? And if not, then how long will Iran continue to implement the nuclear deal without getting the dividends it hoped for?
www.cfr.org/interview/will-decertification-spike-iran-nuclear-accord
What are the grounds for President Trump’s decertification of the nuclear agreement?
The decision is political, not technical. President Trump is signaling to his base that he is tough, and that he’s rolling back some of President Obama’s chief legacies.
Various folks even within the administration—Secretary of Defense [Jim] Mattis and Secretary of State Tillerson—as well as U.S. military personnel, including [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Joseph] Dunford, have said that it is in the United States’ national interest to stick to the nuclear deal. Even those who were not necessarily in favor of passing it have come out and said that the U.S. should continue to implement it.
There is a broad consensus that Iran has been complying with the nuclear deal. The [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] director-general, Yukiya Amano, gave remarks just days before President Trump’s decertification remarks saying that Iran was complying with the deal. That’s also the position of the European Union and the Joint Commission [established by the JCPOA to mediate its implementation]. And when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with the Iranians [at the UN General Assembly in September], he said there is no question that the Iranians were complying with the technical elements of the deal.
But the president also believes Iran is not in compliance with the “spirit” of the nuclear deal. The Europeans and others have said that containing Iran’s nuclear program contributes to international peace and security, even if [there has not been] a huge overhaul in Iranian behavior. But the deal wasn’t meant to address all the challenges Iran poses to stability and security in the region and beyond. It was designed as a very focused process, curtailing the country’s sensitive nuclear activities.
This speech comes just a few weeks after Trump extended waivers on nuclear-related sanctions. What outcome is he after now?
The president has gone for something like the DACA move: passing the buck to Congress. In essence, the president is decertifying the deal not on the grounds that Iran is failing to uphold its end of the bargain—though he has also indicated that he believes Iran is not complying with the deal—but due to his view that the deal isn’t in the U.S. national interest. This kicks the ball to Congress.
Congress can refuse to impose more sanctions, avoiding rocking the boat any further. Another scenario would be that Congress imposes sanctions. Quite a few moderate Republicans who were against the nuclear deal seem to believe that it is not in the United States’ interest to withdraw from it currently, and so they would be reluctant to impose more sanctions, but it is too close to call.
The third emerging option would be for Congress to hold off on imposing new sanctions but to unilaterally install new goal posts, or so-called trigger points. In other words, it’d say, for example, that if Iranian breakout time—the time it’d take to accumulate enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon—goes below the current estimated one-year mark, sanctions would be automatically imposed. This option means Congress would modify the agreement by itself, with little or no input from the other parties, imposing restrictions on Iran that it hasn’t agreed to and would have no reason to implement.
What if Congress declines to reimpose sanctions?
In that case we’re not necessarily going to see a big immediate effect on the nuclear deal, but there will be an impact down the road.
A couple of questions that will have to be answered are: How sustainable will the deal be without the United States? And how will uncertainty surrounding the future of the deal impact economic recovery for Iran? There’s already been uncertainty because of the 2016 [U.S.] presidential elections. This has added to challenges stemming from Iran’s own domestic challenges—corruption, mismanagement of the economy—as well as the remaining sanctions. All of these have made investors and businesses reluctant to jump into the Iranian market. But with the deal decertified by the president, the looming threat of more sanctions, and the moving of goal posts by Congress, will businesses and investors go into Iran? And if not, then how long will Iran continue to implement the nuclear deal without getting the dividends it hoped for?
www.cfr.org/interview/will-decertification-spike-iran-nuclear-accord